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EUROPEAN STREET GANGS  
AND URBAN VIOLENCE
Keir Irwin-Rogers, Scott Decker, Amir Rostami, Svetlana  
Stephenson and Elke Van Hellemont
Introduction
Gangs are predominantly an urban phenomenon. From the seminal work of Thrasher (1927) that 
focused on gangs in Chicago almost a century ago, to the substantial global body of studies that has 
been established in recent decades, one factor that characterizes the vast majority of gang literature is 
its city-based context (Bradshaw 2005; Densley 2013; Esbensen and Carson 2012; Gutierrez Rivera 
2010). Another characteristic feature of gang research is violence. Whilst studies have established a 
link between prior levels of aggression and the likelihood of someone joining a gang, gang involve-
ment in turn appears to promote and facilitate enhanced levels of violence (Klein et al. 2006). 
Indeed, many ethnographies of gangs indicate that violence plays a central role in gang culture 
(Decker and Van Winkle 1996; Densley 2013).
The purpose of this chapter is to provide readers with an insight into gang-related violence, 
and responses to gang-related violence, across a number of European cities. To this end, it brings 
together city-specific sections written by subject experts who have resided and conducted research in 
four European countries: the UK, Belgium, Russia and Sweden. Each section of the chapter follows 
a similar structure: first, we provide contextual information about gangs in each city; second, we 
discuss data on gang member demographics; third, we consider the nature and scale of gang-related 
urban violence; and fourth, we outline some of the main policy responses aimed at tackling gang 
violence, including any references to public health approaches to violence reduction.
Studies that compare gangs across different jurisdictions are relatively rare. From obtaining the 
financial and social capital to make international comparative projects feasible, to establishing ade-
quate levels of equivalence in research design and methods across diverse geographical locations, 
comparative research is seldom simple or straightforward (Beyens and McNeill 2013). The primary 
intention of this chapter is not to draw direct, like-for-like comparisons between the composition, 
nature or scale of gangs and gang-related violence across different European cities. The decision to 
include cities from four European countries in the chapter’s scope – London, UK; Brussels, Belgium; 
Kazan and Moscow, Russia; and Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, Sweden – represents a com-
promise between, on the one hand, our desire to avoid an overly narrow and skewed lens and, on 
the other, the need to provide an adequate level of analytic depth.
Whilst urbanization has brought about significant health benefits for billions of people across the 
globe, providing enhanced job opportunities and access to a range of important services and tech-
nologies, it has also generated a number of economic, social and environment determinants that have 
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the potential to impact negatively on people’s health (Zuckerman 2014). Among the latter is the 
tendency for large cities to be afflicted by high rates of serious violence, often linked in some form 
to the prevalence of urban street gangs. By providing an in-depth examination of selected cities, this 
chapter provides some indication of the diversity of gangs and gang-related violence across Europe, 
whilst also indicating important areas of convergence. Each city-specific section draws on a range of 
data sources to provide readers with an insight into the most useful and up-to-date evidence avail-
able. The chapter also performs a useful function in flagging areas where data are lacking and thereby 
identifies areas that are particularly in need of better data-recording practices and further research.
London
Accounts of street gangs in the UK’s capital date back at least to the nineteenth century, with youth 
violence characterizing much of the literature (Gray 2013). In recent years, however, there has 
been a marked increase in public and political concern around youth gang involvement in London, 
centred primarily on gang-related violence (Harding 2016; Home Office 2016; Newton 2017). 
Academic research is polarized: on the one hand, some researchers have argued that gang ‘problems’ 
are inflated by professionals and ‘gang talkers’ with vested interests in exaggerating the nature and 
scale of youth gangs (Fraser and Atkinson 2014; Hallsworth and Young 2008; Smithson and Ralphs 
2016); other researchers, however, have sought to highlight the serious levels of violence committed 
by street gangs and the negative effects that gang involvement has on outcomes for young people 
(Densley 2013; Harding 2014; Pitts 2012).
With 8,787,892 inhabitants residing across an area of 607 square miles (1,572 square kilome-
tres), London is the third largest city in Europe by population (Office for National Statistics 2017). 
It also has one of the greatest disparities in all of Europe with regard to wealth distribution: the 
top 10 per cent of households have amassed a combined wealth of £260 billion, compared to 
the bottom 10 per cent, who are indebted with a negative wealth of minus £1.3 billion (New 
Policy Institute 2017). An obvious and visible reflection of wealth inequality is manifested in the 
form of housing (see Figure 27.1). Figure 27.2, comprising two maps of London, one of gang 
territories and one of socioeconomic deprivation levels, provides a stark visual illustration of the 
overlap between the presence of youth gangs and deprived urban areas.
The left-hand side of Figure 27.2, uploaded to Google Maps in 2015, purports to delineate 
the territories of London’s street gangs as of 2015: 33 in West London, 63 in East London, 51 in 
North London and 47 in South London, making a total of 194 street gangs, similar to the 186 gangs 
on a matrix compiled by the Metropolitan Police (MET), which serves the Greater London area 
(Bridges 2015; Osbourne 2015). From a geographic standpoint, clearly there is overlap between 
economic disadvantage and gang membership, a finding consistent with research from the US 
(Pyrooz et al. 2010).
Demographics of Gang Members
Most quantitative data available on gangs in London have not been generated by academic studies, 
but by the recording practices of government agencies. A freedom of information (FOI) request 
submitted in 2016 revealed the race/ethnicity breakdown of gang members on the MET’s gangs 
matrix (Table 27.1).
It should be noted, however, that some have condemned the gangs matrix as a form of institu-
tionalized racism that has led to the over-policing of Black, Asian and minority ethnic communities 
(Smithson et al. 2013). In large part, this is due to the opaque criteria and processes used to classify 
people as gang members (Williams 2015).1
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Figure 27.1  London streetscape. Urban street gangs in London are typically associated with relatively cramped 
and dilapidated housing estates and high-rise tower blocks. For example, the Locksley council 
estate in East London has historically been associated with a street gang known as the Limehouse 
Massive. As illustrated by the photo of the Locksley estate (middle), corporate skyscrapers and 
luxury apartment blocks situated in wealthy financial and business districts often loom over these 
housing estates, acting as a continuous reminder of significant wealth inequalities.
Photos: Kieran Larkin (top); Keir Irwin-Rogers (middle); Melisa Tokel (bottom).
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An FOI submitted in 2014 revealed that ages on the matrix ranged from 13 to 53, with almost 
half of all gang members between the ages of 18 and 21 and less than 15 per cent under the age of 
18 (Metropolitan Police Service 2014). It is worth highlighting that other sources of data on youth 
gang involvement indicate that the MET’s gangs matrix may not provide a comprehensive portrait 
of London’s gangs. For example, only 376 of the 858 young people identified as gang-involved 
by London’s youth offending teams (YOT) featured on the MET’s gangs matrix (MOPAC 2014). 
Moreover, a recent report published by the Children’s Commissioner (2017) estimates that around 
46,000 children aged between 10 and 18 are members of street gangs in the UK. In short, alternative 
sources of data suggest that the MET’s gangs matrix is likely to constitute a considerable underesti-
mate of the scale of young people’s involvement in street gangs.
Gang-Related Violence and Offending
As with gang demographics, the best and most recent quantitative data available on gang-related 
violence come from police statistics. These suggest that violent offences constitute the largest share 
of gang-flagged crime (43 per cent), with drug offences occupying the second largest share (20 per 
cent) and robbery the third (11 per cent) (MOPAC 2014).
 
Figure 27.2 London gang territories (left); levels of socioeconomic deprivation (right).
Sources: Iain Agar; Mapbox; OpenStreetMap.
Table 27.1 Ethnic breakdown of gang members on the London gangs matrix
Code description Number Percentage
1 White – North European 342 9
2 White – South European 139 4
3 Black 2,907 78
4 Asian 224 6
5 Chinese, Japanese or South-East Asian 5 <1
6 Middle Eastern 98 3
Source: Metropolitan Police Service (2016).
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As shown in Figure 27.3, the vast of majority of serious youth violence in London is not flagged 
as gang-related. However, it is worth noting that there is considerable variation between different 
areas of the city, with almost one in five offences in the borough of Hackney being gang-flagged, 
compared to no gang-flagged offences in boroughs such as Richmond upon Thames and Hillingdon. 
These statistics should be treated with some caution. Offences are gang-flagged in the event that ‘any 
individual believes that there is a link to the activities of a gang or gangs’ (MOPAC 2017). Therefore, 
the data displayed in Figure 27.3 are only accurate to the extent that: 1) gang-related offences are 
recognized as such by someone willing and able to influence the crime-recording process; and 2) all 
beliefs about the gang-related nature of offences are accurate.
Figure 27.3 Proportion of gang-related serious youth violence by London borough.
Source: MOPAC (2014).
Table 27.2 Violent crime in London, 2015–2017
2015 2016 20171
Violence with injury















Gun crime with fatal or serious injury







Knife crime with fatal or serious injury 1,215 1,295 918
Gang-flagged knife crime with fatal or serious injury 164 98 63
Source: Metropolitan Police Service (2017).
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A response to a freedom of information request received by the authors in August 2017 revealed 
data about gang-flagged crime in London as shown in Table 27.2.
According to these data, the proportion of violence with injury offences in London flagged 
as gang-related was just 0.8 per cent in 2015 and 0.5 per cent in 2016. In relation to homicides, 
however, gangs were recorded as being responsible for a somewhat greater proportion of offences: 
9 per cent in 2015 and 6 per cent in 2016. Moreover, in relation to homicides involving the use 
of firearms, gangs were implicated in a still greater proportion of offences: 20 per cent in 2015 and 
21 per cent in 2016.
Whilst only a small proportion of violent crime in London appears to be gang-related, there 
are indications that gang members account for a much higher proportion of violence that results 
in serious levels of harm, especially homicide. In addition to the data generated by the 2017 FOI 
outlined above, it is worth noting that, in 2007, half of the 27 murders of young people in London 
perpetrated by other young people were flagged as gang-related (Centre for Social Justice 2009). 
Furthermore, statistics suggest that, in relation to knife crime that results in serious injury or mur-
der, over one in five offences are gang-related (MOPAC 2016). Indeed, the evidence indicates that 
young people who are gang-involved are likely to be involved in disproportionate levels of violence, 
and particularly violence generating serious harm, compared to their non-gang peers (Vasquez et al. 
2015). In-depth, ethnographic research exploring gang violence in London suggests that gangs typi-
cally evolve from unstructured adolescent peer groups that engage in expressive forms of violence, 
to relatively organized groups that are likely to use violence instrumentally as a means of controlling 
and expanding illicit drug networks (Densley 2013).
In short, the relatively small proportion of London’s serious youth violence flagged as gang-
related does not indicate the absence of a link between gang involvement and enhanced levels of 
violence, but instead reflects the fact that the large majority of young people residing in the capital 
are not involved in gangs. Those who are involved in gangs appear to be involved in a greater quan-
tity and severity of violence than young people who are not involved in gangs.
Responses to Gang Violence
In 2011, the UK government published a report examining the scale and nature of gang-related 
youth violence. It concluded that ‘a concerted, long-term effort’ was needed, comprising support 
to local areas most affected by gang violence, pathways out of gang culture for young people, pre-
vention initiatives to keep young people from joining gangs, and punishment and enforcement to 
suppress violence (Home Office 2011). This led to the Ending Gang and Youth Violence (EGYV) 
programme, which ran between 2012 and 2015 and has now been replaced by an Ending Gang 
Violence and Exploitation (EGVE) programme (although EGVE has been allocated considerably 
lower levels of funding than its predecessor; Home Office 2016; Perraudin and Elgot 2016).
The EGYV programme involved a range of public, private and third sector organizations and 
operated nationally albeit predominantly across London boroughs. As part of the programme, Public 
Health England (2015) produced a report that considered youth gang involvement as a public health 
issue. It highlighted the enhanced risk of mental illness faced by gang-involved young people and 
suggested that initiatives such as home visiting, parenting programmes and school-based social and 
emotional development programmes offer ways in which to protect young people from risk fac-
tors associated with gang involvement and poor mental health. The report also advocated non- 
stigmatizing, holistic youth outreach services that engaged with young people in their own environ-
ments to protect health and emotional wellbeing. An earlier report, funded by the Department of 
Health, had highlighted the need to ‘break an infective cycle within families, where violence is passed 
from one generation to another’, advocating hospital-based services such as mentoring and counsel-
ling, as well as talking therapies, family therapies and family interventions (Bellis et al. 2012, p. 7).
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An independent evaluation concluded that the quality of data mapping and sharing across a range 
of agencies had improved over the EGYV programme’s life-cycle (Harding 2016). Whilst the evalu-
ation cited ‘positive outcomes’ for the cohorts of young people involved, it was unclear what these 
outcomes constituted – no evidence for any reductions in gang-related violence was cited. The 
evaluation predominantly referred to processes, such as improved multi-agency collaboration, assess-
ments and referrals, as opposed to concrete outcomes.
Some commentators have been fiercely critical of the UK government’s response to gangs. Pitts 
(2017), for example, has argued that intensive and expensive support for families affected by gang 
involvement has been side-lined in recent years because of government spending cuts, only to 
be replaced with cheaper suppression-focused policies badged as ‘improved alternatives’. Similarly, 
Shute et al. (2012) have criticized EGYV’s attempts to address what are essentially social exclusion 
problems with policing and enforcement solutions that are liable to generate greater levels of com-
munity tension and gang-related violence.
Brussels
Gangs in Belgium are a localized and recent phenomenon, with Brussels being the only city with 
an established gang presence. When comparing the prevalence of gangs in Brussels to that of other 
cities, one should consider the city’s characteristics. First, with a surface area of 62 square miles (161 
square kilometres), Brussels is a relatively small city in a comparative global context. In fact, Brussels 
would fit about eight times into the City of Los Angeles and more than ten times into the City 
of London. Despite its small size, Brussels also constitutes a distinct region bordering Flanders and 
Wallonia. Second, Brussels’ population is exceptional on a number of grounds, including its cul-
tural and age composition. With an average age of 37, Brussels’ population is considerably younger 
than that of the two remaining regions (an average age of 42 in Flanders and 41 in Wallonia). The 
city contains exceptional levels of multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. In 2008, 68 per cent of the 
1,048,491 Brussels inhabitants had foreign origins, with 35 per cent of those coming from outside 
Europe. In Flanders only one out of ten inhabitants (13.3 per cent) and in Wallonia (22.5 per cent) 
two out of ten inhabitants have foreign roots (BRIO 2017).
Despite Brussels’ inhabitants reporting gang issues in their neighbourhoods since the early 1990s, 
it was not until 2000 that the police began formally registering gang members. In 1999, the police 
gang database (DBSBU2) was created, which registered gangs, their members and specific gang-
related offences. Since its foundation, however, the lack of a formal gang definition and the sub-
stantial loss of data in 2006 (due to software malfunctioning) have undermined the trustworthiness 
of gang data in Brussels. Gangs do show a close connection to specific spaces within Brussels. Many 
gang labels reflect either the postal code or the name of one of the 19 municipalities of Brussels, such 
as the Versailles gang, which is associated with Versailles Street, and the 1140 gang, which has a clear 
affiliation with the Germinal public housing estate.
Demographics of Gang Members
The data presented in this section were made available in 2009. At that time, 18 different gangs were 
registered, with a total of 431 members (CIA Brussels 2009). The ages of gang members ranged from 
12 to 35 and involved an overrepresentation of the ages 15–22, following the established bell curve 
of youth crime (CIA Brussels 2009; Farrington 1986). In 2013, however, Brussels police estimated 
that 36 gangs with 652 members occupied the streets of Brussels’ Capital Region (Laeremans 2013). 
The gang issues in Brussels reflect many of the city’s multicultural characteristics. In general, police 
gang units differentiate between Sub-Saharan, Maghrebin (or North African) and mixed gangs (con-
taining members of various ethnic background including native Belgians).3
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Gang-Related Violence and Offending
While all gangs in Brussels engage in a cafeteria style of offending, there are some characteristics 
believed to be particular to some gangs, as set out in Table 27.3. However, in considering these 
numbers, one should be aware of the primordial role that police perception plays in generating 
these statistics, as no formal definition is used in the gang labelling process. In fact, in the view of 
the majority of gang unit officers, the only ‘real’ gangs in Brussels are the Sub-Saharan gangs. When 
interrogating this perspective, police officers refer especially to the particularly violent nature of these 
gangs, while other gangs are considered to be more profit-oriented. Or, as one police officer put it:
You have to draw a difference between the black gangs and other groups, especially the 
Maghrebin groups. The Sub-Saharan gangs copy the American model and South African 
gangs. The Maghrebin gangs have in contrast to the black ones, no gang beefs. They 
(Maghrebin gangs) do not fight amongst each other for turf or other futile reasons.
(Nluandu 2009)
These assertions are borne out by the police statistics presented in Table 27.3. The crime percent-
ages for the category of Sub-Saharan gangs are based on 297 gang members who committed 3,111 
offences in total. The percentages for the category of Maghrebin gangs are based on 90 gang mem-
bers who together committed 1,045 offences. Finally, the percentages for the category of mixed 
gangs are based on 44 gang members who committed a total of 402 offences.
Table 27.3 Crime attributed to Sub-Saharan, Maghrebin and mixed gangs1
Sub-Saharan gangs Maghrebin gangs Mixed gangs
n % n % n %
Qualified theft 668 21.5 369 35.3 155 38.6
Drugs crime 573 18.4 134 12.8 26 6.5
Violent crime 563 18.1 135 12.9 40 10.0
White-collar crime 306 9.8 79 7.6 34 8.5
Weapons 293 9.4 38 3.6 12 3.0
Simple theft 257 8.3 66 6.3 59 14.7
Threats and insults 154 5.0 120 11.5 24 6.0
Other crime 123 4.0 37 3.5 13 3.2
Vandalism 116 3.7 55 5.3 35 8.7
Sexual offences 58 1.9 12 1.1 4 1.0
3,111 100 1,045 100 402 100
Violent offences 914 29 185 18 56 14
Property crimes 1,231 40 514 49 248 62
Drugs offences 573 18 134 13 26 6
Disturbing public order 270 9 175 17 59 15
Other crime 123 4 37 4 13 3
3,111 100 1,045 100 402 100
Source: CIA Brussels (2009).
Note: 1 These statistics are the result of an analysis performed on the police gang database – the Database 
Stadsbendes/Bandes Urbaines (DBSBU) – in 2009. The classification ‘property crime’ includes the categories: 
qualified theft, simple theft and white-collar crime. The classification ‘violent offences’ comprises the catego-
ries: violence, sexual offences and weapons. The classification ‘disturbing public order’ contains the categories: 
threats and insults and vandalism.
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To reiterate, the extent to which these statistics are an accurate reflection of gang-related crime 
in Brussels, or an artefact of police enforcement decisions remains uncertain. However, even taking 
into account some degree of enforcement bias, the rate of Sub-Saharan gangs’ violent offences is 
considerably higher than that of Maghrebin gangs or mixed gangs. It is also worth noting that there 
are strong indications that the overrepresentation of Sub-Saharan gangs in drugs offences is mainly 
due to police registration bias (Van Hellemont 2017).
Consistent with police perspectives, non-Sub-Saharan gangs seem to have a clear orientation 
to profit-motivated activities. So, while the largest share of all gangs’ criminal activities is property 
crimes, it is especially dominant in the case of the mixed gangs (63 per cent), compared to Maghrebin 
gangs (49 per cent) and Sub-Saharan gangs (39 per cent). Maghrebin gang members are charged at 
a relatively high rate for disturbing public order (17 per cent); threats and insults to police make up 
70 per cent of these public order offences.
A range of professionals involved in prevention and repression policies agree, however, that it is 
not necessarily the amount of violence that sets Sub-Saharan gangs apart from other gangs so much 
as the degree and nature of the violent offences. Gang homicides involving weapons, for instance, 
are a unique characteristic of Sub-Saharan gangs in Brussels. Whilst 16 of such homicides have 
been recorded since 2005, the precise number is difficult to estimate, as the police typically neglect 
to distinguish between homicides that are gang-related and those that are not. It is likely that this 
number overestimates the true level of gang homicides. For instance, if gang homicide is redefined 
as a homicide committed by a gang member against another gang member, this would reduce ‘gang 
homicides’ occurring since 2009 from five to one (Van Belle 2009, p. 2). In any case, the numerous 
non-lethal but spectacular fights that occur with Sub-Saharan men as perpetrators and victims are 
more important. Or, as recounted by police officers:
These [Sub-Saharan] gangs’ engagement in crime is actually not exceptional, but the degree 
of violence in gang confrontations is absolutely mind-blowing! There is something really 
particular to the Black [Sub-Saharan] gangs. The degree of violence, the choice of weap-
ons: machetes, pliable saws, knives, sables, hammers. Exceptional violent scenes! Other 
gangs mostly fight bare hand or use occasionally a knife. But the Black gangs . . . they 
always have this arsenal of weapons on them. I don’t even understand where they put it.
(Police officer Evere 2)
These fights are not common occurrences, but when they do occur they often have an extraordinary 
and public character. In 2010, for example, a young Sub-Saharan man affiliated with the 1140 gang 
was stabbed to death by four members of the Versailles gang at the entrance of a dance hall (Van 
Hellemont 2015). More than 50 bystanders witnessed the attackers stabbing the victim several times 
using sabres and knives, pursuing and ultimately killing him when he tried to escape. While these 
events are spectacular, these forms of lethal violence are rare within the Brussels Sub-Saharan gang 
world. Moreover, ethnographic work revealed that many gang-related violent offences are instances 
of ‘incompetent violence’ (Collins 2009; Van Hellemont 2015). Rather than an offence being driven 
by a strict ‘code of the streets’ (Anderson 2000), opportunism and fear play a prominent role in 
selecting the victim, time and place of retaliation.
Responses to Gang Violence
Police and prevention agencies have designed multiple projects and tools, such as the database on 
urban gangs (DBSBU), to facilitate gang prosecution. In fact, the same circular of the Prosecutor’s 
Office that allowed for the construction of the gang database also created the label BU (bandes 
urbaines – urban gangs). The label BU is an instrument of prosecution intended to allow criminal 
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justice agencies to monitor gang members more closely. An offender is eligible for the BU label if 
he/she has committed 1) at least two out of the list of 14 offences defined as ‘urban gang offences’, 
2) within a period of six months and 3) in a group (with more than one person). The label has two 
major consequences for its bearer: he/she 1) can be more easily subjected to invasive police practices, 
and 2) in case of a violation the offender will be automatically brought before a prosecutor or mag-
istrate. However, while the name of the label alludes to gang affiliation, the wide scope of the label 
turned it into an instrument to increase control of multi-offenders in general, and it thus extends 
beyond gang membership.
At the time of this writing, professionals involved in preventive and repressive gang policies had 
reported significant difficulties in addressing what they define as the most harmful aspect of Sub-
Saharan gangs: excessive and expressive forms of violence within the Congolese diaspora. Indeed, it 
is worth highlighting that policies in Brussels to tackle gangs and gang-related activities often fail to 
go beyond general initiatives aimed at reducing youth crime. To date, no public health approaches 
to reducing gang violence have been implemented in Brussels.
Kazan
The city of Kazan, situated on the Volga River about 800 kilometres from Moscow, is the capital 
of the Republic of Tatarstan and part of the Russian Federation. In their modern incarnation as 
entrepreneurial and territorial groups, gangs in Kazan emerged between 1970 and 1975 as youth 
peer groups with roles as violent enforcers in the shadow economy. This period saw the appearance 
of shadow producers (tsekhoviki) in the Soviet Union, when managers of state companies began ‘off-
the-books’ production and distribution of goods. The new unregulated economic sector needed its 
structures of informal protection and enforcement, and these were provided by the so-called thieves-
in-law, a closed society of professional criminals (Gurov 1990; Salagaev 2001). Young boys and men, 
brought up in the culture of tough masculinity, and involved in the networks of solidarity and reci-
procity, and in some cases also having informal leadership, were a highly valuable resource for the 
thieves-in-law, who turned into ‘violent entrepreneurs’ (see Blok 1974; Volkov 2002), agents using 
violence for economic gain. The groups developed structures of leadership and internal discipline 
and started to use weapons. Other youth groups, who did not want to be subsumed by expanding 
entrepreneurial gangs, organized into more rigid structures, fighting to protect particular estates and 
territories from ‘annexation’ (see Figure 27.4).
At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union went through a deep crisis associated with economic 
liberalization and the end of the one-party state. Many young men began to develop ‘alternative 
careers’ in the informal and illegal economy. New cooperative businesses and private enterprises 
were emerging, and a vast array of entrepreneurial activities suddenly opened up at street level, 
including outdoor markets, small stalls and kiosks, parking lots, street drug trade and prostitution. 
State law enforcement was highly ineffective and corrupt, and could not guarantee safety for busi-
nesspeople or enforce business deals and obligations. Many of the existing street gangs moved to 
control the economic opportunities on their local turf, taking ‘dues’ from people involved in the 
street-level economy, with new gangs also emerging.
Demographics of Gang Members
The subject of street gangs has until recently been largely neglected by Russian academics. Similarly, 
law enforcement agencies have neglected to systematically collect data on gangs in Kazan. The 
most recent data come from an ethnographic research project conducted in Kazan in 2005–2011 
(Stephenson 2015). The research revealed that gangs in this city are ethnically mixed, reflecting 
the diverse yet highly assimilated local population, and tend to be young men between the ages of 
Tayl r an  Fra ci
Not f r distributi n
Figure 27.4  A Kazan housing estate associated with street gangs. This industrial area of the city was at the 
epicentre of gang violence in the 1990s. Although the biggest local gangs have been undermined 
by a series of gang trials, the district still has the highest level of crime in the city, with members 
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16 and 30, with the leaders (usually the gangs’ founding fathers) reaching up to 50 years of age. They 
have substantial memberships – up to 300 people in some areas. Younger boys from the age of 13 
who are involved in local street peer groups have contact with the gangs that they aspire to join but 
cannot yet be accepted into as formal members.
According to local police experts, before the mid-1990s gang members tended to be young men 
from working-class backgrounds or delinquent school drop-outs. But over the years, as Kazan’s 
gangs became institutionalized in the neighbourhood, they started to attract young men from well-
off and highly educated families, including the families of businesspeople, doctors, lawyers and the 
police.4 The gang became an institution that locals could turn to if they became victims of crime 
committed by people outside the area, whose permission was needed if somebody wanted to open a 
small business in the neighbourhood, and whose leaders sometimes participated in community pro-
jects, building local mosques and churches, providing money for organized events and celebrations, 
or ‘sponsoring’ the local police (Stephenson 2015).
Gang-Related Violence and Offending
Kazan gangs are pursuing a variety of entrepreneurial strategies: offering protection to business-
people, mediating in disputes, and protecting the underworld of gaming parlours, prostitution 
rings and the drugs trade. Younger gang members are primarily tasked with controlling small-scale 
economic operations, with more senior gang members controlling, and increasingly owning, large 
businesses, such as networks of supermarkets, agricultural holdings and large-scale drug busi-
nesses. Violence, and more often its threat, is an essential resource for illegal business activities, 
and gangs cultivate what Volkov (2002, p. 71) calls a ‘reputation for resolve, or other qualities 
enabling effective control of possible threats’. For the gang to remain a successful enterprise, it 
must become a recognized force in the city. It can then enjoy an influx of new members, expand 
its business interests and deal more successfully with the demands of the city authorities and law 
enforcement agencies.
In the 1990s, when they were actively appropriating territory, gangs were involved in high 
levels of serious violence in which weapons such as firearms were routinely used. From the mid-
1990s, however, gang wars began to subside as the Russian state became stronger. In recent years, 
violence is typically non-fatal and used to settle individual scores or as a general demonstration of 
a gang’s strength. Nevertheless, conflict between individual members of different gangs or col-
lective disputes over businesses can easily flare up and lead to organized conflicts. Whilst these 
conflicts are usually resolved through negotiation between gang leaders, younger members can 
be tasked with invading rival territory and orchestrating attacks if these negotiations fail. These 
attacks are often well-organized and involve the taking of hostages, with intelligence, such as the 
addresses of rival gang members, being obtained in advance to maximize the likelihood of success. 
The gang code in Kazan does not allow members to make empty threats involving the display of 
weapons; if knives or guns are brandished, gang members should be prepared to use them. The 
code therefore typically acts to limit both the use of weapons in conflict and consequent fatalities 
(Stephenson 2015).
Moscow
Like many other Russian cities, Moscow has a tradition of youth street socialization, which takes 
place in peer networks of various levels of organization (Gromov 2009). In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, many Moscow gangs emerged in a similar way to that seen in Kazan, namely, by transform-
ing themselves into ‘violent entrepreneurs’ and developing racket and protection networks. This was 
particularly the case in the depressed Moscow suburbs of Lyubertsy and Solntsevo (Gromov 2006). 
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With the city’s growing economic prosperity in the twenty-first century,5 however, Moscow’s gangs 
started to disintegrate, and many of their members, at least those who had survived the preceding 
violent gang wars, turned to legitimate or semi-legitimate activities.
Demographics of Gang Members
Street networks in Moscow typically comprise several friendship groups of six to eight members liv-
ing in the same block(s) of flats with the same or neighbouring courtyards (see Figure 27.5).
The core contingent of the friendship groups is aged from 13 to 17, with predominantly male 
membership, although girls and young women may also be involved. Unlike ethnically mixed Kazan 
gangs, contemporary Moscow territorial networks tend to be composed largely of ethnic Slavs. 
While the members of the Kazan gangs come from a variety of social backgrounds, Moscow groups 
unite young people from predominantly the working and lower class (Stephenson 2012).
Gang members’ collective identity as representatives of the local turf becomes juxtaposed to that 
of their ‘enemies’. Young people who are members of alternative subcultural groups, for example 
punks, rappers or visible homosexuals, may all be designated as enemies and subjected to violent 
attacks. Ethno-nationalist discourse is an important part of the construction of ‘us versus them’, and 
people from Central Asia or the Caucasus are routinely victimized.
Gang-Related Violence and Offending
Although they share many pursuits with mainstream youth, gang members are also involved in vio-
lent and other criminal activities. Some sustain their street lifestyle by petty crime, mainly through 
stealing or shoplifting. The motive for acquisitive crime is typically short-term and hedonistic rather 
than long-term and calculating, with money being spent on peer group activities involving gaming 
machines or the consumption of alcohol or marihuana. Gang members also steal cars, sometimes 
to sell to local criminals for small sums of money, but often simply for fun – to engage in joyriding 
before abandoning the vehicles.
While acquisitive crime is generally episodic and not displayed by all gangs or their members, 
everybody is involved in violent battles for control over their neighbourhood. This includes intimi-
dation of the non-affiliated youth and warfare aimed at enhancing status and protecting territory. 
Some gang members extort money, watches and mobile phones from other young people, predomi-
nantly non-affiliated local youth and outsiders who intrude into the gang’s local territory. Unlike in 
Kazan, there are no institutionalized neighbourhood gangs that recruit young people for entrepre-
neurial criminal activities (see Table 27.4). Most gang-related street crime in Moscow is inseparable 
from the overall goal of reproduction of the group as collective masters of the street. Young men use 
it to confirm their power in their area, demonstrating the right to dictate the rules of behaviour to 
other participants of the street space. Street victimization is only partially oriented towards material 
gains, being an instrument of sustaining the group’s territorial domination (see also Dowdney 2005; 
Rodgers 2009).
While older Moscow residents remember the whole of the city being divided into different 
groups’ territories, nowadays these groups tend to be concentrated at the outskirts of the city. This 
pattern of territoriality confined to the city periphery seems to be characteristic of large urban settle-
ments in Russia, although in small and medium-sized towns territorial groups tend to be geographi-
cally more dispersed (Golovin and Lurie 2008).
One of the key cultural practices of the Moscow street gangs is arranged combat – a ritual where 
members of different territorial groups meet to stage a fight under certain conditions and limitations. 
Apart from being a way to resolve individual confrontations, arranged combats are used by differ-
ent street groups to test their strength, settle disputes or confirm territorial boundaries. Arranged 
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Figure 27.5  Moscow housing estates associated with street gangs. Urban street gangs in Moscow are typically 
situated in old industrial territories, like these two areas in Southern and South-Eastern Moscow. 
These territories are divided into industrial zones and ‘dormitory’ zones with high population 
density. Since the start of the market reforms, many large industrial enterprises in these territories 
have gone through several waves of redundancies. The average price of housing here is lower 
than in other Moscow regions, and the area attracts significant migration.
Photos: Georgy Krasnikov (top); nedomoskvich.ru (bottom).
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combat limits the risks and dangers of violent confrontations. The members agree in advance on 
the approximate number of fighters and whether weapons, such as chains, clubs or knuckledusters, 
but never guns or knives, can be used. The friends of the members often come to watch the fights 
and record them on their mobile phones; these videos are now often uploaded to social media web-
sites, such as YouTube. The fight is turned into a festivity which celebrates violence and unleashes 
collective emotions and energies (Stephenson 2012). Agreed-upon rules of collective fights limit 
violence to more controlled and ordered forms (Ben-Ari and Fruhstuck 2003; Bloch 1986; Collins 
2009; Girard 2005).
Responses to Gang Violence in Kazan and Moscow
The key responses of the Russian law enforcement agencies to street gang violence are: measures 
to ‘disassociate’ the gangs; attempts at surveillance of gang membership through registration and 
monitoring; investigation and assessment of individual cases to see if a gang member can be ‘normal-
ized’ in the community; and criminal prosecution for more serious crimes. ‘Disassociation’ is aimed 
at undermining gang solidarity and at isolation of the leaders. Police officers talk to young people 
and try to persuade them to stop their gang affiliations. They also try to involve parents in these 
efforts. Sometimes they deliberately insinuate that this or that gang member is a police informer in 
order to sow discord in the gang. The police conduct special raids on places where gang members 
congregate and register any arrested gang members. Those who are caught are typically charged with 
‘minor hooliganism’ or violation of public order. Anyone under 14 is taken to the police division for 
minors, and older gang members are processed by the police criminal investigation divisions, which 
have special gang task forces (Safarov 2012; Stephenson 2015).
All identified gang members are registered in a special database, where they remain for six months. 
If at the end of that time they have not been arrested again and have a positive report from their offi-
cial workplace or place of study, they are removed from the register. The police also visit neighbours 
and ask them for references for the young person in question in order to decide whether to remove 
the person from the database. If there is no evidence of improvement of behaviour, the registration 
is extended. Once registered, underage gang members are sent to the special police divisions for 
minors for ‘re-education’, which typically involves discussion with a police inspector. Schools and 
parents are informed and gang members are invited to sessions of the Inter-Agency Working Group 
on Minors, which sits under the regional Prosecution Office. This is attended by representatives 
from the Prosecution Office, the chair of the Commission on Minors of the district administration, 
representatives of the military commissariat, and the district Department of Education. Juvenile 
gang members attend with their parents. These efforts are aimed at subjecting gang members to 
enhanced levels of community control. Recently, the Russian Ministry of Education has issued 
Table 27.4 Summary of gang structures, types of violence and targets of violence, Kazan and Moscow
Kazan Moscow
Gang structure Hierarchical with leadership 
and internal discipline.
Largely egalitarian with informal leadership.
Types of violence Instrumental and 
entrepreneurial violence.
Spontaneous and at times ritualized in the form 
of arranged combats.
Targets of violence Businesses and individual 
entrepreneurs in licit and 
illicit economies.
Local non-gang members and representatives of 
groups defined as the ‘enemies’ (homosexuals, 
members of ethnic and racial minorities, 
members of youth subcultures, etc.).
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an order requiring school teachers to inform the police if any of their students belong to ‘criminal 
subcultures’. Whilst some of these measures look similar to the components of public health models 
in other countries, such as the UK, Russian authorities have made little explicit reference to the 
substantial body of public health literature when outwardly framing their responses to gang violence 
(Stephenson 2015).
Although there are no statistical data on prosecutions for specific activities associated with street 
gang membership, interviews with police experts and with gang members show that prosecutions 
tend to be for minor offences such as violation of public order and minor hooliganism, as well as 
burglaries, grievous bodily harm and drug-related offences (Stephenson 2015). Whilst the organiza-
tion of, and participation in, an organized criminal group (OPG) or community (OPS) is a criminal 
offence according to articles 209 and 210 of the Russian Criminal Code, gang-associated youths are 
not routinely prosecuted simply for being part of a gang, associating with gang members or wearing 
gang colours.
Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö
Despite a proliferation of gangs and urban violence in Sweden, there is a paucity of academic 
research on Swedish street gangs. Alongside the academic neglect, there has been a general reluc-
tance by government authorities to recognize street gangs as an emerging internal security challenge. 
Where attention has centred on gangs, the concept of ‘organized crime groups’ has typically been 
preferred over ‘street gangs’. However, what Swedish authorities consider to be organized crime 
groups could often be classified as street gangs under the Eurogang definition.6 Indeed, there is a 
fundamental lack of clarity around the concepts of gangs, crime networks and organized crime in 
Sweden (for further discussion, see Rostami 2016; Rostami and Leinfelt 2012).
The lack of academic attention in combination with difficulties in gathering information on 
gangs – both from law enforcement agencies and from other sources – has resulted in limited data 
on gang membership. However, new attempts are being made to strengthen the data on gangs and 
organized crime in Sweden (see IFFS 2017), with one notable exception being the Stockholm Gang 
Intervention Program (SGIP). In 2009, SGIP started as an attempt in developing innovative gang 
prevention strategies by understanding Swedish street gangs through the lens of the extant inter-
national street gang literature. Within the framework of this project, a number of studies emerged 
which have begun to shed light on the development and key characteristics of street gangs in Sweden 
(Leinfelt and Rostami 2012; Rostami and Leinfelt 2012; Rostami, Leinfelt, and Brotherton 2012; 
Rostami, Leinfelt, and Holgersson 2012). This section is also based on ongoing research7 that studies 
the organization of antagonistic groups, such as the crime–terror nexus, and includes recent data on 
gun violence in the metropolitan areas of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö.
Demographics of Gang Members
In an attempt to study Swedish street gangs, Rostami, Leinfelt, and Holgersson (2012) applied 
the Klein and Maxson (2006) gang typology on a dataset of seven Swedish street gangs, including 
individual-level data on 239 gang members (all gang members in the dataset study were males). This 
research found that gang members ranged in age from 15 to 49 years and that the mean and median 
age varied between the examined gangs, ranging from a mean age of 23 years to a mean age of 34 
depending which gang was studied. Based on this study it appears that Swedish gang members are 
similar to gang members in other European nations but have a higher mean age than that previously 
reported in relation to street gangs in the USA (Klein et al. 2006). According to an international sur-
vey of students between the ages of 12 and 15 – the Second International Self-Report Delinquency 
Study (Gatti et al. 2011, p. 208) – 6.8 per cent of Swedish respondents were members of ‘deviant 
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Figure 27.6  Rinkeby in the district of the Rinkeby-Kista borough (top) and Tensta in the district of the 
Spånga-Tensta borough (bottom), city of Stockholm, Sweden. Built in the 1960s, Rinkeby and 
Tensta were part of the so-called Swedish million program, a public housing initiative of the 
1960s and 1970s. Rinkeby and Tensta reflect the typical design of residential areas of the million 
program, suburban neighbourhoods with high concentrations of housing blocks together with 
a range of services, including shopping centres, schools and libraries. Today these suburban 
neighbourhoods are part of the police list of ‘especially vulnerable areas’, socioeconomically 
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youth groups’, defined as ‘any durable, street-oriented youth group whose own identity includes 
involvement in illegal activity’.
Swedish street gangs are ethnically heterogeneous in terms both of ethnic ties and of country 
of birth. Gang membership is not related to a specific ethnicity, region or culture. As is the case in 
countries around the world, street gangs in Sweden tend to be concentrated in areas of relatively high 
socioeconomic deprivation (see Figure 27.6).
Roughly 42 per cent of members are born in Sweden and 76 per cent are first- or second- 
generation immigrants from 35 different countries (Rostami, Leinfelt, and Holgersson 2012). In 
2012, the duration of the seven street gangs varied between 2 and 18 years. However, today four of 
the seven have been dissolved, which is in concert with what has previously been reported on US 
and European street gangs having up to a five-year duration (Klein et al. 2006).
Gang-Related Violence and Offending
In recent years, a number of high-profile incidents have pushed gang-related violence up the politi-
cal agenda in Sweden. In March 2015, two young adults were killed and eight injured in a gang-
related mass shooting (SVT 2016). In June 2015, a car bomb targeting a gang member killed three 
young men and a four-year-old girl (Aftonbladet 2016). In August 2016, an eight-year-old boy was 
killed when a hand grenade was thrown into an apartment in an attempted assassination of a gang 
member (Aftonbladet 2016). Police stations and police officials were targeted by hand grenade attacks 
and other explosive devices in 2017 (Göteborgs Posten 2017). Whilst drive-by shootings, associated 
primarily with American gangs, are now a feature of the Swedish gang landscape, the latter is also 
characterized by the use of hand grenades and car bombs. In addition, there are signs that there may 
be a nexus between gangs and violent extremism in Sweden (Sturup and Rostami 2017).
Street gangs in Sweden have versatile criminal behaviour patterns involving a wide range of 
offences, from minor to serious, including property offences, drug-related offences, public disorder, 
weapon offences, and various violent crimes such as robberies, assaults and homicides. However, 
there is one case of specialized criminal behaviour pattern. Whilst none of the street gangs examined 
in the study seems to be territorially bounded, recent developments and law enforcement reports 
indicate that the emerging street gangs are less formally organized than the first generations of street 
gangs in Sweden. They are more territorially bounded with local focus, are more violent and have 
lesser duration (Polismyndigheten 2015, 2017). However, more qualitative and quantitative research 
is needed to understand the current organization of street gangs and assess recent trends in Sweden.
Sweden has witnessed a dramatic change in gun violence in the last 20 years (Granath and Sturup 
2018; Khoshnood 2017; Rostami 2017; Sturup, Rostami, Gerell et al. 2018; Sturup, Rostami, 
Mondani et al. 2018). There has been an overall increase in the rate of being a victim and a perpetra-
tor of a violent crime committed with a firearm, which is especially pronounced in individuals aged 
15 to 29 years. There was also an increase in both fatal and non-fatal gun victimization between 
1996 and 2015 regarding males over the age of 15 and males aged between 15 and 29 years. A similar 
pattern can be found for gun victimization, with an overall rate of homicidal gun victimization of 
0.1 per 100,000 inhabitants for females and 0.4 per 100,000 inhabitants for males (Sturup, Rostami, 
Mondani et al. 2018). The trend seems to be that gun violence is becoming concentrated in urban 
areas. The National Council for Crime Prevention (2015) stated that the distribution of violence in 
Sweden in the 2000s has become increasingly similar to that in countries such as the Netherlands, 
Germany and Spain, where violence is concentrated in urban areas, and less like that in Northern 
European countries such as Finland and Estonia.
While there has been sporadic use of hand grenades by gangs in Sweden, there has been a trend 
towards their increasing use: in 2010 there was just one recorded detonated hand grenade attack, in 
2011 there were two, and in 2016 there were 39. Overall, between 2011 and 2016, 1,165 shootings 
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and 54 hand grenade attacks were identified in the three largest cities in Sweden: Stockholm, 
Gothenburg and Malmö (Sturup, Rostami, Gerell et al. 2018). Near-repeat patterns were found 
with a significantly elevated risk of a new near-repeat shooting within a relatively small distance and 
time period in all three cities. This retaliatory violence is taken to be gang-related conflict (Rostami 
2017; Sturup, Rostami, Mondani et al. 2018).
Whilst the largest share of firearm offenders (in relation to deadly and non-deadly shootings) in 
Eastern, Southern and Western Europe are aged between 30 and 34, in Northern Europe the largest 
share are aged between 20 and 24. This trend is explained by a ‘huge presence of gangs in Sweden 
who are composed of young men dealing with local criminal activities and internal struggles’ (Savona 
and Mancuso 2017, p. 24). Indeed, crime groups that predominantly fit the Eurogang definition 
of street gangs have been recognized as one of the greatest challenges to the security of at least 23 
socioeconomically deprived areas in Sweden (Polismyndigheten 2017).
Responses to Gang Violence
The increase in urban violence has contributed to an awakening in the policy community to the 
fact that Sweden has a serious gang problem. For example, the Swedish prime minister, Stefan 
Löfen, announced that ‘gang crime is going to be broken down’, and the Swedish interior minister 
stated that gangs will meet the ‘iron fist’ of the authorities after a series of gang-related serious crime 
incidents (Dagens Nyheter 2017). This awakening has occurred at the same time as the largest police 
reform in the history of Sweden, in which 21 independent county police authorities have been 
replaced by one national police force (Polissamordningen 2015). Owing to the rate of gun crime, 
particularly in the largest three cities in Sweden, some efforts to turn the tide on violent crime have 
been made. Several long-time police operations have been initiated to allocate and concentrate 
police resources to designated areas, such as operations Mareld, Tore, Fenix, Selma and Trygg i 
Göteborg. These operations have mainly been built around coordinated police investigations, direct 
patrolling, proactive arrest, multi-agency cooperation and administrative measures together with 
tougher legislation against criminals.
In 2017, the Swedish police were planning to implement methods based on group violence inter-
ventions (GVIs), family liaison officers (FLOs) and the reinsertion of special gang units as a method 
of reducing gun crime in general and gang-related gun crime in particular (Polismyndigheten 2017). 
Whilst there have been some attempts to reduce violence in Sweden based on public health principles, 
there is little evidence of the public health literature shaping responses to gang violence more specifi-
cally. Some of the responses noted above (particularly the use of FLOs) appear to parallel components 
of public health models for gang-related violence reduction in other countries, but they have not been 
outwardly framed as public health approaches by the Swedish authorities. Finally, it is important to 
note that these gang violence reduction initiatives are yet to be subject to robust evaluative research.
Discussion
It is important to reflect on some of the conclusions made by the authors of a paper on street gang 
violence in Europe published over a decade ago and to consider the extent to which those conclu-
sions are supported or challenged by the contemporary portraits of gang-related violence provided 
in this chapter (see Klein et al. 2006). First, the paper suggested that the levels and severity of 
gang-related youth violence were generally lower in European countries than in the United States. 
Considering the nature and scale of gang violence in many US cities at the time of writing, this 
assertion continues to be uncontentious. In 2015, for example, whilst there were 165 gang-related 
homicides in Los Angeles, the highest number of gang-related homicides in a UK city was just 11, 
in London (LAPD 2016).
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The authors of each country profile in the 2006 paper also observed that gang members appear to 
engage in substantially higher rates of violence than their non-gang peers and that gang involvement 
enhances violence over and above the impact of association with delinquent peers (Klein et al. 2006). 
Again, these statements appear well supported by recent research. In relation to the cities covered 
in this chapter, evidence is provided in the form of both quantitative data on gang-related offending 
and qualitative studies, which establish reasonable grounds for expecting enhanced levels of violence 
amongst those involved in gangs. One conclusion from the earlier work in particular, however, is 
not supported by the findings presented in this chapter. The authors of the 2006 paper concluded 
that ‘in many cases territoriality seems to be absent in European gangs’ (Klein et al. 2006, p. 433). In 
recent years, it is clear that territoriality has played a central role in gang-related violence in a num-
ber of European cities. In relation to Moscow, for example, we have seen how territory is central 
to both gang identities and violence between rival gangs. In London, gang members typically view 
incursion into a rival gang’s territory as an effective means of bolstering one’s status and reputation, 
as well as a means of humiliating one’s rivals and provoking a response. Similarly, in Brussels, whilst 
territory seems relatively unimportant to Maghrebin and mixed gangs, it appears to play a greater role 
in violence perpetrated by Sub-Saharan gangs.
With regard to responses to gang-related violence, compared to the US context there appear to 
be almost no robust evaluation studies of particular approaches in the European context. Whilst pub-
lic health approaches to reducing gang-related youth violence, such as the use of home visits, parent-
ing programmes, talking therapies, and school-based social and emotional development programmes, 
have been advocated in the UK, they have invariably been implemented on insufficient resources, 
and there is a lack of evidence for their effectiveness (Catch22 2013; Pitts 2017; UK Faculty of Public 
Health 2016). In Russia, Belgium and Sweden, there is little explicit reference to public health litera-
ture in official policy responses to gang violence, nor do initiatives aimed at tackling gang violence 
appear to be based on public health principles. It is worth noting that this contrasts significantly with 
anti-gang initiatives in the USA, which often display a closer affiliation with public health approaches 
to violence reduction (Simon et al. 2013).
It is worth noting that researchers studying gangs in Europe typically have had to rely on quan-
titative data from government agencies – predominantly the police – to analyse the various forms 
and amount of gang-related violence. Whilst this has provided some important insights, reliance on 
police statistics serves to highlight the general lack of reliable data on youth gang involvement and 
gang-related violence across Europe. Whilst a better quality and quantity of data are collected and 
published by US criminal justice agencies compared to those in Europe, it is worth noting that a sub-
stantial body of evidence in the US has also been generated by studies involving surveys with school 
students (see, for example, Decker and Curry 2000; Esbensen et al. 2013; Pyrooz 2014; Swahn et al. 
2010). As a significant number of gang-involved young people in some parts of the USA are school 
attendees, these studies have produced valuable insights into gangs and gang-related violence.
In European cities, however, data generated by similar methods are of questionable value. In 
cities such as London, for example, a relatively low number of young people are involved in street 
gangs. Of this small sub-group of young people, research indicates that up to two-thirds have been 
permanently excluded from mainstream education (Home Office 2011; Pitts 2006). At best, there-
fore, research using school surveys would produce insights into a small and skewed sub-sample of 
the wider population of gang-involved young people. At worst, by sampling what is likely to be an 
unrepresentative group of fringe gang members – or, to use a concept recently developed to measure 
differential levels of people’s involvement in gangs, gang members with low levels of ‘embeddedness’ 
(Pyrooz et al. 2013) – it could produce misleading conclusions about the scale and nature of gangs 
and gang-related violence in European cities.
Instead of sampling young people in mainstream educational facilities, researchers aiming to pro-
gress knowledge and understanding of gang-related violence in Europe might find it more fruitful 
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to engage third sector organizations that work with relatively large numbers of hard-to-reach young 
people in the community, or with criminal justice bodies, such as youth offending teams in the UK, 
which supervise convicted gang-involved young offenders. To this end, researchers are well placed 
to conduct comparative projects owing to the valuable work of the Eurogang network, an ongo-
ing international collaboration of academics and professionals. The network has produced a range 
of research instruments (translated into several languages), alongside in-depth and comprehensive 
guidance for researchers intending to conduct comparative research projects on gangs (see Weerman 
et al. 2009).
Conclusion
Considerable progress has been made in understanding gangs in Europe over the past two decades. 
At the turn of the century, many researchers, policy makers, criminal justice professionals and politi-
cal leaders denied the existence of gangs across the continent. In academia, for example, opposition 
stemmed from researchers opposing knowledge transfer across the Atlantic, opting instead to frame 
gangs as a uniquely ‘American phenomenon’. Many professionals, including politicians, police offic-
ers and teachers, downplayed the problems posed by youth gangs, in large part to avoid potentially 
negative ramifications, such as having to redirect already stretched resources into tackling gang vio-
lence (Centre for Social Justice 2012).
Research over the past two decades, however, has provided evidence of the presence of youth 
gangs in a number of European cities. Whilst the scale of gang violence in US cities is generally 
greater than in their European counterparts, youth gangs are nevertheless responsible for dispropor-
tionate levels of serious violence in Europe. In addition, there are many similarities between gangs 
in the US and Europe in relation, for example, to the use of weapons and the territorial nature of 
conflict. But perhaps the most obvious point of convergence for gangs across the globe is their urban 
context, which acts as a crucible for violence.
The similarities between gangs in the US and Europe offer considerable promise for crafting effec-
tive responses based on US models. Learning from mistakes made in the US would put European cities 
in a stronger position to respond to the growth of youth gangs and avoid mere political posturing. In 
the US, careful evaluations have documented that suppression and enforcement tactics, when used 
alone, are ineffective and may make gang violence worse (Greene and Pranis 2007; Kennedy 2011). 
Successful interventions appear to be multifaceted, consisting of a suppression component that works 
in tandem with various forms of prevention and opportunities provision, crisis intervention and re-
organizing of existing services based on public health principles (Simon et al. 2013). In the past, many 
interventions have been well developed but poorly implemented, or not sustained when implemented.
At the same time that specialized gang responses are developed, it is important to address the 
fundamental macro-level social and economic factors that drive the growth of youth gangs and 
the violence that accompanies them. These include gross income inequality, concentrated poverty, 
burgeoning illicit drug markets, a lack of productive employment, and educational systems that fail 
to educate. As these are concentrated in urban areas, it is no surprise that these are the places where 
gangs are found to flourish.
Notes
1 The racial disproportionality of gang members reported in these data is greater even than that for the US.
2 DBSBU is the acronym of Database Stadsbendes/Bandes Urbaines and contains all registered gang members. 
It is managed by the federal police.
3 In Belgian law ethnicity cannot be included as a variable in official crime registration (statistics). This catego-
rization is made on the basis of police field knowledge.
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4 This is similar to the changes in the social composition of Italian mafia families between the 1950s and 1970s, 
although one difference is that mafia members must have no personal or family links to the police – this is not 
the case in Kazan (Arlacchi 1986).
5 At the time of writing, the rate of unemployment was under 1.5 per cent.
6 The Eurogang approach defines a street gang as ‘any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement 
in illegal activity is part of its group identity’ (Weerman et al. 2009).
7 Supported by grants from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB 2016-486, 2016-7045).
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